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Alvin Camba
Chief Scientist and Director of Research, Lyvi;
Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Atlantic Council's Indo-Pacific Security Initiative
Speaker Biography:
Alvin Camba is Chief Scientist at Lyvi, where he leads a team of researchers working with engineers and data scientists to develop SIGMA, a next-generation supply chain intelligence platform funded by the U.S. Department of War and other public and private partners. His work focuses on identifying hidden industrial dependencies, transshipment networks, critical-material vulnerabilities, and other risks relevant to the U.S. defense industrial base. He is also a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a Senior Research Fellow at Associated Universities, Inc. He received his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University and is the author of the forthcoming Cornell University Press book, The Allocation Dilemma: Chinese Megaprojects and Coalition Politics in Southeast Asia. He has published 28 peer-reviewed journal articles, 14 book chapters, 17 policy reports, and more than 50 policy essays and public-facing pieces, including work in Foreign Affairs. He has received multiple academic awards and, as a principal investigator or co-principal investigator, has secured more than $2 million in research funding.
Abstract:
Why is expanding upstream extraction and securing access to new ore bodies insufficient to end American mineral dependence on Beijing? Chinese firms dominate the midstream in critical resources, including solvent extraction, calcination, metal reduction, alloying, and magnet sintering. Beijing refines roughly 85 percent of global rare earth elements, processes about 90 percent of graphite, and controls nearly all germanium, gallium, and tungsten refining. I argue that Washington should scale midstream funding to $40 to $80 billion over the next decade because new American smelters take 10 to 20 years to reach operation. The Trump administration has identified the right instruments, moving government capital into processing through the Office of Strategic Capital, equity stakes, bilateral minerals frameworks, and procurement restrictions in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. However, refining, separation, and metallurgical capacity require ten times that level of federal commitment to blunt Chinese geopolitical leverage over the midstream. Congress and the Pentagon should change the terms on which they finance refining and appropriate new funding for workforce and research. First, because Chinese producers can lower prices at will, as oversupply did to lithium in 2023 and nickel in 2024, the Office of Strategic Capital should extend equity and offtake positions that take the loss when prices fall instead of loan guarantees, under which private investors take that loss. Second, because 221,000 mining sector workers retire by 2029 and only 14 accredited metallurgy programs remain, construction money without a corresponding increase in graduates will build furnaces that too few Americans are qualified to operate. Third, foreign-owned intellectual property covers the separation chemistries, magnet formulations, and specialty alloys these plants need, which the Defense Production Act cannot transfer because seizing material does not transfer the knowledge to process it. Federal money should purchase those licenses and invest in research and development.